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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 
Volume 10 Fall 1992 Number 1 
Private Property Investment, Lucas and 
the Fairness Doctrine 
John R. Nolon* 
I. Looking at Both Sides of the "Takings" Issue 
In a recent visit to the campus of Pace Law School, Jer- 
old Kayden, a Senior Fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, paid this institution a worthy compliment. After work- 
ing with us for a time, he noted, with favor, that our property 
and land use faculty members are in close touch with our en- 
vironmentalists. I imagine that Mr. Kayden respects this co- 
operation because it mirrors the type of collaboration between 
property rights defenders and environmental advocates that 
ought to be taking place in society generally. 
Unfortunately, conferences and conversations on the Lu- 
* Mr. Nolon is the Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor at  Pace Law School 
in White Plains, New York, where he teaches and writes in the areas of land use, 
property, environmental regulation and real estate transactions and finance. He has 
published a book on residential development for McGraw-Hill, sewed on BNA's edi- 
torial bobd for the Housing and Development Reporter and advises on rural and 
urban development in Latin America. B.A. University of Nebraska 1963; J.D. Univer- 
sity of Michigan 1966. 
My thanks to Eyleen Hawki i ,  my research assistant, for her help in organizing 
these colloquium remarks for presentation here. Some of the points explored here 
have been incorporated into an article on regulatory takings law that was published 
in the JOURNAL OF LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Vo1. 8, NO. 1, September 
1992. I t  is entitled: Footprints on The Shifting Sands of The Isle of Palms, A Practi- 
cal Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases. 
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casl case tend to be confrontational rather than collaborative. 
Worse, the property rights and environmental movements em- 
ploy "spin masters" to turn the case to their advantage to the 
considerable confusion of property owners and regulators who 
are trying in earnest to understand the Supreme Court's view 
on the, matter. In the interests of looking at the issues from 
both sides a t  this colloquium, let me enter the discussion from 
the perspective of the property owner. These remarks are not 
intended to advocate the interests of the new property rights 
movement. In fact, those advocates will be disappointed by 
what I say. Rather, I aspire to view the issue of real property 
regulation as broadly as possible, reaching beyond the juris- 
prudence of regulatory takings cases into the realms of real 
estate transactions law and comprehensive land use planning. 
11. Inherent Property Rights 
The recent emergence of an aggressive property rights 
movement, a counterpoint in the 1990's to the aggressive envi- 
ronmental rights movement of the 1970'9, is due in large part 
to the perceived over-regulation of property. The language 
used by judges, journalists and commentators signals the arri- 
val of this interest group on the regulatory scene and reflects, 
to an extent, its sentiments. For example, one recent law re- 
view article discussing the impact of regulations on property 
values is entitled "Predatory Municipal Zoning  practice^."^ 
Justice Scalia saw in the facts of the Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission case an "out-and-out plan of extorti~n."~ 
The New York Times recently characterized the forces behind 
the plethora of cases that challenge regulations as takings 
under the Fifth Amendment as a property rights "move- 
ment."' The Washington Post wrote that these forces are "an 
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S .  Ct .  2886 (19921, rev'g and 
remanding, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991). 
2. Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Pre- 
sumption of Constitutionality in the Wake of the "Takings Trilogy," 44 ARK. L. REV. 
65 (1991). 
3. 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987). 
4. Keith Schneider, Environment Laws Face a St iff  Test from Landowners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al. 
Heinonline - -  10 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 44 1992-1993 
19921 LUCAS COLLOQUIUM 45 
increasingly militant property righb m~vement."~ 
There is additional evidence that a major assault on prop- 
erty regulation is underway. The Spokesmen for the Alliance 
for America, a recently formed organization chartered to fight 
environmental laws, called the environmental movement an 
"evil empire," using such terms to elicit contributions to their 
~ampaign.~ The Wise Use Movement, a grassroots coalition of 
250 groups, asserts that private property owners should be al- 
lowed to use their land as they see fit. The Heritage Founda- 
tion sees in the U.S. Constitution an inherent property right. 
In a recent Issue Bulletin (No. 173), the Foundation wrote 
that: "Each American correctly considers it her or his birth- 
right to be free to acquire land on which to build a home or to 
use however she or he sees fit, so long as this use does not 
interfere physically with the rights of  neighbor^."^ Such orga- 
nizations are becoming more unified as a result of their fund- 
raising and lobbying efforts, and they are achieving wide noto- 
riety due to the media attention they actively seek and 
receive. 
Jennifer Nedelsky, in her book Private Property and the 
Limits of American Constitutionalism, attributes to the foun- 
ders of the federal republic a deep interest in the protection of 
private p r ~ p e r t y . ~  She postulates that the security of property 
was integral to the economic and political success of the new 
nation. She writes that "[ilf property could not be protected, 
not only prosperity, but liberty, justice and the international 
strength of the nation would ultimately be destr~yed."~ 
Nedelsky also argues that the "focus on property as the para- 
digmatic right to be insulated from the democratic process 
created a general notion of rights as natural and uncontested 
5. Kirstin Downey, A Conservative Supreme Court Addresses Property Rights, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1992, at HI. 
6. Timothy Egan, Fund-Raisers Top Anti-Environmentalism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
9, 1991, at A18. 
7. William G. Laffer 111, The Private Property Rights Act: Forcing Federal Reg- 
ulators to Obey the Bill of Rights, HERITAGE FOUND. REP. Iss. BULL. 173 (1992), at 13. 
8. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTI- 
TUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990). 
9. Laura S. Underkauffler, The Perfidity of Property, 70 TEX. L. REV. 293, 299 
(1991) (citing NEDELSKY, supra note 8, at 6). 
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in nature."1° She adds: "property was treated as a sacred 
value that required protection, not evaluation."" 
111. Flexible Definition of Property 
Whether a property right exists that is immune from po- 
lice power regulation is a much-debated topic. Despite the 
amount of energy expended to uncover such a right, no case 
has ever identified it in any quantifiable or irreducible form. 
The evidence that such efforts are in vain is considerable. 
In 1878, Professor von Jhering wrote "there is no absolute 
property, i.e., property that is freed from taking into consider- 
ation the interests of the community, and history has taken 
care to inculcate this truth into all  people^."^' In his book 
Real Property, Powell notes that a property owner "must ex- 
pect to find the absoluteness of his property rights curtailed 
by the organs of society, for the promotion of the best inter- 
ests of others for whom these organs also operate as protective 
agencies."18 Professor John Cribbet writes that: "[Ilt is still 
incorrect to say that the judiciary protects property. Rather, 
the judiciary calls property that which they protect, and that 
which they protect is forever in transition."14 
These authors believe that the regulation of property 
rights will increase as the complexity of society increases. 
Powell notes that "[tlhe necessity for such curtailments is 
greater in a modern industrialized and urbanized society than 
it was in the relatively simple American society of 50, 100, or 
200 years ago."16 Cribbet agrees: 
As our concepts of property have evolved, the balance has 
shifted from an excessive emphasis on individual rights 
toward a greater dominance of the social interest. 
10. Id.  at 300 (citing NEDELSKY, supra note 8, at 184-85). 
11. Id.  (citing NEDELSKY, supra note 8, at 186). 
12. R. VON JHERING. DER GEIST DES ROMISHEN RECHTS AUP DEN VERSCHIEDENEN. 
STUQWN SEINER ENTWICKLANG 7 (4th ed. 1878). 
13. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 745, at 493 (1970). 
14. John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Defini- 
tion of Property, 1 U .  ILL. L. REV. 41 (1986). 
15. 5 POWELL, supra note 13, at 493. 
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Whether this has been altogether a good and wise shift . . 
. has been, and will be, the subject of much debate. The 
fact that a shift has occurred, however, is difficult to 
deny.le 
IV. The Need for Collaboration 
The balance between individualism and dominance of the 
social interest is a t  the core of Professor Cribbet's recent writ- 
ing and fairly characterizes the exploration of the U.S. Su- 
preme Court in recent regulatory takings cases." Lucas is 
among a number of cases that have ferreted out overreaching 
regulations and warned regulators not to engage in such ex- 
cesses. Since there is no fixed definition of what property is, 
both sides of the debate should concern themselves with the 
proper balance between the freedom to use as the owner sees 
fit and society's need to regulate that use in the community's 
interest. It  is in achieving this balance, not in a search for fun- 
damental constitutional principles, that the interests of both 
sides will be protected and the case law can be understood. All 
of this amounts to a call for collaboration in regulating prop- 
erty only as far as necessary to protect legitimate public 
objectives; collaboration of the type Jerold Kayden lauded a t  
Pace Law School. 
The dangers of not collaborating to find a reasonable bal- 
ance between property rights and the public interest clearly 
are visible in recent legislative initiatives that respond to the 
lobbying of the property rights movement. The Private Prop- 
erty Rights Act of 1991,'' which was supported by the Bush 
administration but not adopted by Congress, would have sub- 
jected all federal regulations to a "takings impact analysis" 
and constrained the issuance of needed and useful environ- 
mental regulations.le At least thirteen states - Alabama, Ari- 
16. Cribbet, supra note 14, at 42. 
17. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 825 
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
18. The Private Property Rights Act of 1991, S. 50, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
19. Id. 
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zona, California, Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Vermont 
and Washington - have recently considered property rights 
legislation in one or both of their legislative houses. These 
proposals either require state agencies to conduct takings im- 
pact analyses prior to the issuance of new regulations or they 
define a compensable.taking and require payment for diminu- 
tions in property value if a use-restricting regulation is 
enacted. 
Such legislative proposals are less likely to succeed if the 
need for them is not felt by lawmakers. This need is less likely 
to be felt if regulators proceed fairly, giving the impact of 
their regulations on property owners the type of consideration 
that would be mandated by these proposed statutes. More im- 
portantly, regulations that intrude on such uses only as far as 
necessary to accomplish their environmental or other public 
objectives are less vulnerable to invalidation in the courts by 
judges trained to respect private rights as well as legislative 
discretion. 
If this call to maximum fairness in regulations is ignored, 
regulators run the risk of offending the sensibility of the legis- 
lators and judges and having their regulations scrutinized 
more rigorously. If a regulation is designed to be fair, the 
Court's "sense of justice" is less likely to be offended. Sensing 
fairness, the Court is less likely to conclude that the takings 
clause is implicated, and will tend to adopt a deferential pos- 
ture in reviewing the regulation in question. Legislators, sens- 
ing fairness in regulatory regimes, will be less moved by their 
propertied constituents to limit the discretion of regulatory 
agencies. 
V. Private Market Obstacles to the Development of the 
Lucas Lots 
A. The Capacity of the Lucas Lots to be Developed 
An exploration of the reasonableness of the South Caro- 
lina regulation that prevented David Lucas from building any 
permanent structures on his two beach front lots should be- 
gin, like a buyer's due diligence analysis of the property, with 
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an examination of its inherent characteristics and its suitabil- 
ity for development. 
The Isle of Palms, where these lots are located, is a highly 
dynamic area. Its shoreline is a shifting one. The shifts are 
due to wave action and tidal currents in an inlet between the 
Isle of Palms and an island to its north. Currents carry sand 
from this northern island into the inlet, where the sand col- 
lects in bars or shoals. If the inlet channel shifts, as it.does 
periodically, shoals can break off and move toward the Isle of 
Palms, creating sand bars. These masses can cause waves to 
bend around their edges, causing erosion on the Island on ei- 
ther side. Since the late 1940's, the shoreline of the Isle of 
Palms, although generally moving seaward, has shifted occa- 
sionally as these currents have moved. Sometimes the shore- 
line has been 200 feet or more inland of its current position 
seaward of the Lucas lots. During these times, the Lucas lots 
have been under water; houses built on them would have been 
flooded. 
The State of South Carolina argued before the U.S. Su- 
preme Court that, due to the unstable nature of the barrier 
island, there was a high risk that structures and their occu- 
pants would be vulnerable to adverse weather conditions. As 
borne out by Hurricane Hugo, extreme winds break up struc- 
tures on barrier island beachfronts and carry them like projec- 
tiles onto adjacent areas; severe storms sever septic tanks and 
sewer lines causing costly contamination of coastal waters. 
The cost to the public for cleanup and relief following such 
catastrophes is considerable. 
Lucas owned an equity interest in the development com- 
pany that had built homes on the Isle of Palms. He purchased 
his two lots from 'that same company. As a licensed realtor 
and property developer with experience in developing proper- 
ties on the fragile barrier island where his land is located, he 
should be charged with knowledge that the lots he purchased 
were limited in their capacity to be developed and sold. This 
is explained below by reference to prevailing trends in the 
brokerage, insurance and mortgage fields that affect any home 
builder, seller or purchaser in the area. 
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B. Liability to Disclose Property Defects 
The traditional property perspective in the purchase of 
realty begins with the common law concept of caveat emptor, 
"let the buyer beware." Upon purchase, the buyer accepts the 
risk of all defects in the property. From this concept flows the 
notion that purchasers of real property must conduct "due 
diligence" analyses of properties before they buy. Should they 
fail to do so, or to protect themselves from property defects in 
the contract and deed, they have no subsequent claim against 
the seller for conditions they should have discovered prior to 
purchase. Having conducted such an analysis and purchased 
the property, owners, in the vernacular of regulatory takings 
cases, are said to have certain "reasonable investment-backed 
expectations" in their purchase. Among the matters they 
should have investigated is the regulatory environment affect- 
ing the land, its physical condition, and the availability of in- 
surance and financing for their properties. Absent a contract 
provision to the contrary, the seller takes no responsibility for 
these matters subsequent to purchase. The buyer assumes this 
risk and must carefully analyze the regulatory environment, 
the business prospects for development and the physical char- 
acteristics of the property during the pre-purchase phase of 
the transaction. 
When a regulation that severely diminishes the property's 
value is adopted after the contract to purchase is signed, the 
buyer is in the position of the plaintiff in Stambovsky v. Ack-. 
ley, a recent New York decision.s0 The owner, Mrs. Ackley, 
had created a local perception that the single-family house 
Mr. Stambovsky had contracted to buy from her was haunted 
by a jovial Revolution-era ghost. Mr. Stambovsky, unfamiliar 
with local lore, found out about this reputation only after he 
had signed the contract, but before the passing of title. The 
court found that the contract was inequitable and should be 
rescinded because the seller had created a condition that ma- 
terially affected the property's value and that he could not, 
despite due diligence, discover the defect. In the court's 
20. 169 A.D.2d 254, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991). 
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words, "Who you gonna' call?" to inspect for ghosts.a1 
Property rights advocates logically view the specter of 
regulations that materially affect property values in this same 
way, particularly when they are passed, as in Lucas, after 
purchase. If "who you gonna' call?" applies, and there was no 
notice of the need for the regulation, the purchaser may be 
treated unfairly. But, when the inherent properties of the land 
or patent environmental conditions in the area suggest the 
need for limitations on the use of the property in the broad 
public interest, the inequitable nature of the regulation 
abates. Whether we, as a society, are in agreement as to 
whether a buyer should expect regulation for environmental 
reasons is the key question that plagues regulatory takings ju- 
risprudence. There is considerable evidence emerging from 
the context of real estate transactions law that buyers should 
become more knowledgeable in this area. 
As an active participant in the local real estate industry, 
Lucas knew, or should have known, of the provisions of the 
1977 South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Actaa which 
placed prospective purchasers on notice of the nature of the 
limitations on the development adjacent to the shoreline and 
of the potential for future restrictions on that development. 
The state, in fact, had appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission 
to investigate these problems further and propose solutions to 
them in 1986, before Mr. Lucas purchased his lots. The ap- 
pointment of this Commission and its charge were well cov- 
ered in the state and local press a t  the time. 
In Stamboosky, the seller was not liable for the diminu- 
tion of value; the contract was simply rescinded as inequita- 
ble.a8 In New York, sellers are liable at law for damages for 
their failure to disclose material property conditions only in a 
few circumstances. Across the nation, however, this seems to 
be changing. Sellers of residential properties, and their bro- 
kerage agents, are increasingly held liable for their failure to 
disclose material defects that are not normally discoverable by 
21. Id. at 257, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 675. 
22. S.C. CODE ANN. 5 48-39-10 et. seq. (Law Co-op. 1987). 
23. 169 A.D.2d 254, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991). 
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the average buyer. In Easton v. Stras~burger,~' for example, 
the seller and broker were held liable for not disclosing certain 
soil conditions that indicated a mud slide was imminent. The 
purchaser of the single-family house on that lot was successful 
in a damage action' against them, after the home was totally 
destroyed by a major soil movement that occurred soon after 
he purchased the property.g6 
Easton is a California case, followed recently by courts in 
several other jurisdictions. Some estimates coming from the 
brokerage insurance industry indicate that over two-thirds of 
buyer's claims against brokers involve non-disclosure; the av- 
erage insurance award in such cases has more than doubled 
since 1984, when Easton was decided. Since 1984, six state 
legislatures have passed bills requiring sellers to disclose prop- 
erty defects.2e By the end of 1993, such bills will be under 
consideration in twenty-one .state  legislature^.^^ Thirty-three 
states have some form of voluntary disclosure and four others 
are considering it.28 The judicial, legislative and market per- 
spective on this matter is that the seller and the brokerage 
agent are in a better position to discover and disclose latent 
defects than the buyers - particularly the normally unsophis- 
ticated purchaser of a single-family home. 
The fear of liability for non-disclosure has led, even in 
states where the law does not require it, to the practice by 
brokers of requiring their listing sellers to complete a full dis- 
closure statement which is then passed along to the prospec- 
tive buyer. Recently, Caldwell Banker announced that sellers 
listing property with the national real estate brokerage com- 
pany must fill out and sign property defect disclosure forms. 
The 800,000-member National Association of Realtors re- 
cently announced plans to lobby lawmakers in all states that 
do not have seller disclosure laws to pass them.2e Interest- 
ingly, the local practice among brokers in the Isle of Palms 
24. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1st Dist. 1984). 
25. Id. at 105, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392. 
26. James D. Lawlor, Seller Beware, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 90. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
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area is to require sellers to sign disclosure statements listing 
defective conditions in their properties. 
This trend among brokers is due, in part, to a canonical 
duty that professional brokers have to discover and disclose 
property defects. Under Article 9 of the Code of Ethics of the 
National Association of Realtors, brokers are required to 
"avoid exaggeration, misrepresentation, or concealment of 
pertinent facts."30 They are under an "affirmative obligation 
to discover adverse factors that a reasonably competent and 
diligent investigation would discl~se."~~ Brokers have been 
disciplined by their Professional Standards Committee, for 
example, for failing to discover and disclose to the buyer that 
a home on a city block was not connected to the public sewer 
Mr. Lucas claimed at trial that his intention was to de- 
velop houses on the two lots. He had engaged an architect to 
draw plans and planned to sell at least one of the houses in 
the private market. In South Carolina, this sale is affected by 
a state statute that recognizes seller responsibility to disclose 
physical deficiencies. A bill which became effective in 1990 
frees sellers and brokers from disclosing psychological defects 
of real property, while affirming their duty to disclose material 
defects: "This section does not relieve an owner or agent of an 
obligation to disclose the physical condition of the 
premises. "s3 
Where there are recent movements in the soil, as in Eas- 
ton and in Lucas, and given the seller's duty to disclose them 
to potential buyers, the property's marketability and market 
value are questionable. This is true, despite the fact that, in 
recent years, beachfront lots on the Isle of Palms have been 
selling. These sales are due primarily to the availability of 
government-sponsored property insurance programs, and 
there is some evidence, now discoverable by purchasers, that 
30. NATIONAL ASS'N OF REALTORS, CODE OF ETHICS (1982). 
31. Id. 
32. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 101 n.6, 199 Cal. Rep. 383, 389 
n.6 (1st Dist. 1984). 
33. S.C. CODE ANN. 40-57-270 (Law Co-op. 1990) (previously 1990 Act No. 481, 
$1, effective May 14, 1990). 
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these programs are being ,rethought, particularly insofar as 
they encourage construction in high-risk areas. 
C. Availability of Insurance and Mortgage Financing 
A bill that passed the House of Representatives in 1991, 
by a margin of 388 to 17, would eliminate flood insurance for 
new construction of homes in erosion hazard areas.34 The 
House received testimony that severe coastal' storms could 
cost the federal treasury billions of dollars because of its cur- 
rent obligations under this progra~n.~Vayrnents due to Hurri- 
cane Hugo, a single event, cost federal taxpayers over $300 
million.36 There was also testimony before the House that the 
existence of the insurance program was singularly responsible 
for much of the development of housing in. coastal areas such 
as the Isle of Palms.s7 
Private market flood and storm-risk insurance in such ar- 
eas, where it can be obtained, carries yearly premiums ap- 
proaching 10% of a home's value - a prohibitive amount. 
Private market insurance companies in the Isle of Palms area 
do not provide insurance at all for homes built within 1000 
feet of the high tide line. This area of disability includes the 
Lucas lots. I t  also includes the set back zone in which devel- 
opment was prevented by the 1988 Beachfront Management 
Act contested in the Lucas case. 
The South Carolina legislature created the Windstorm 
and Hail Insurance Underwriting Association and mandated 
membership in it by insurance companies writing property in- 
surance in the state. Members must participate in the Associ- 
ation's shared-risk pool, which is the only source, other than 
federal flood insurance, of storm-related casualty insurance in 
the 1000-foot zone of disability designated by the private 
34. National Flood Insurance Compliance Mitigation and Erosion Management 
Act, H.R. 1050, 102d Cong., 1st Seas. (1991). 
35. Cornelia Dean, Beachfront Owners Face Possible Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 
1992, at Al. 
36. National Underwriter Co. Property & CasualtyEtisk & Benefits Management 
Edition, Flood Plan Pays a Record $365M in S.C. Hugo Losses, at 35 (Oct. 22, 1990). 
37. Dean, supra note 35, at Al. 
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companies themselves. Presumably, the state legislature could 
act to limit its insurance requirements, leaving beachfront de- 
velopers in high risk areas no method of obtaining casualty 
insurance. There is no evidence that the state legislature is 
inclined to do so, but it is noteworthy that the entire South 
Carolina congressional delegation voted in favor of H.R. 1236 
that would have eliminated, flood insurance coverage for new 
construction in high-risk areas. I t  is also interesting that some 
property rights groups, iuch as the Heritage Foundation and 
the Cato Institute, have joined the environmental lobby in op- 
posing government-sponsored property insurance in areas 
deemed by the private market to be unduly risky. 
If property insurance for storm-related risks is not ob- 
tainable by buyers, they cannot obtain private market con- 
struction or permanent loans for their properties. Conven- 
tional mortgage lenders in the Isle of Palms market area will 
not finance property purchase or development unless evidence 
of property insurance is provided as part of an application for 
such finance. Because of these customs and practices in the 
unregulated private market, most lots in this area of disability 
would not be developed but for the availability of govern- 
ment-sponsored insurance programs. 
D. Legitimate Investment-Backed Expectation 
The judgment of the unregulated private market in the 
Isle of Palms seems to be that beachfront construction is a 
doubtful, high risk business venture. Developers in the area 
would argue that development is encouraged and enabled by 
government-sponsored insurance programs that were available 
when they purchased beachfront lots and are available to- 
day.98 Over time, however, buyers conducting due diligence in- 
vestigations may conclude that these government programs 
are not reliable and that potential changes in them may im- 
pugn the ability of owners to develop or market their proper- 
38. Between January, 1990 and August, 1992, for example, 54 beachfront lots 
were sold on the Isle of Palms. Thirty of them were vacant; they sold for an average 
price of just over $250,000. Twenty-four of them were developed & single-family lots; 
their average sales price was just over $500,000. 
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ties in the future.sB 
The judgment of the private market - the realtors, the 
insurance industry, and mortgage lenders - is that the type 
of permanent construction that is prevented by the Beach- 
front Management Act at issue in the Lucas case is a high- 
risk venture. In regulatory takings terms, Mr. Lucas, as a pur- 
chaser of beachfront lots, may not have "reasonable invest- 
ment-backed expectations" that sustain the considerable price 
he paid.40 If his expectations were reasonable, at the time of 
purchase, would a purchaser from him today have defensible 
investment-backed expectations? If not, should the taxpayers 
bear the burden of this change in society's view of the wisdom 
of developing on the beach? These transactional considera- 
tions are critical to the issue of the essential fairness of the 
regulation as well as to assessing how much of a loss Mr. Lu- 
cas suffered because of it." 
E. The Wisdom of Judicial Usurpation of Legislative 
Discretion 
These facts raise an interesting question of whether the 
limitations on development imposed by the regulation chal- 
39. Additional evidence of the private market's adjustment to the new realities 
of beachfront development on barrier islands can be seen in the plans underway on 
Dewees Island immediately northeast of the Isle of Palms. One hundred and fifty 
homes are being sold on this 1200-acre island. The community, which will be deed- 
restricted to guarantee no further development, is being marketed as a "no negative 
impact development." Privately imposed setback restrictions on beachfront lots range 
from about 450 feet to 700 feet. The 150 homes are served by only three miles of road 
of natural sand base construction. Vehicles are limited to golf carts and small electric- 
powered cars. 
40. Was Lucas's decision to buy these lots reasonable if it was based on the con- 
tinuing availability of costly government-sponsored insurance programs? If the an- 
swer is yes, does this indirectly oblige government to continue programs that its tax- 
payers cannot afford? 
41. In its order on .remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that 
. there exists no common law basis to justify the prohibition of all development of the 
Lucas lots. In remanding the case to the circuit level, the Court held that Mr. Lucas's 
damages shall be limited to those actually "sustained as a result of his being tempora- 
rily deprived of the use of his property." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
1992 WL 358097, at  *2 (S.C. Nov. 20, 1992). 
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lenged in Lucas "inhere in the title [of the property] itself,"4a 
as the majority decision required, not because of common-law 
nuisance limitations, but due to local industry practices, 
shaped by prevailing legal considerations in the unregulated 
private market.43 A corollary question is whether the elimina- 
tion of these government-sponsored insurance programs 
would constitute a "newly legislated" limitation on develop- 
ment of the type Justice Scalia says legislatures may not pass 
without compensation, if their effect is to deny all productive 
use of the land. Simply stating these queries raises obvious 
questions about the wisdom of judicial usurpation of legisla- 
tive prerogatives in these complex and interrelated areas of 
society. 
The federal and state legislatures collaborated in regulat- 
ing development in coastal areas through the passage of com- 
plementary statutes: the Coastal Zone Management Act and 
the Beachfront Management Act. If they can collaborate in 
eliminating government-sponsored insurance programs that 
enable most of the development in high-risk areas along 
coastal beaches, should the court constrain their ability to reg- 
ulate such development by the more direct means contested 
in the Lucas case? 
VI. The Nuisance Law Limitation on Total Takings 
The Court in Lucas held that the regulation, since it took 
all value, is a taking requiring compensation unless develop- 
ment of the lots could have been prevented under the com- 
mon law nuisance doctrines of South Carolina. There is con- 
siderable irony in this reliance on the common law of nuisance 
in Lucas. We were instructed in 1970 by New York's highest 
state court that litigation under nuisance doctrines was not 
competent to resolve the broad geographical impacts of air 
pollution and similar rnatter~.'~ The court wrote: 
42. 112 S. Ct. at 2900. 
43. Id. at 2901. 
44. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,309 N.Y.S.2d 312,257 N.E.2d 
870 (1970). 
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A court should not try to do this on its own as a by- 
product of private litigation and it seems manifest that 
the judicial establishment is neither equipped in the lim- 
ited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor pre- 
pared to lay down and implement an effective policy for 
the elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond 
the circumference of one private lawsuit. I t  is a direct re- 
sponsibility for government and should not thus be un- 
dertaken as an incident to solving a dispute between 
property owners and a single cement plant - one of 
many - in the Hudson Valley.'" 
This judicial sentiment is not limited to the courts in 
New York. A recent Florida decision reviewing the establish- 
ment of a coastal construction control line, affecting particu- 
larly the development of the barrier islands, contains this 
statement: 
Evaluation of the economic, environmental, and geophysi- 
cal concerns underlying the wisdom and desirability of so 
regulating land use along the Florida beaches is, however 
a political matter for determination by the legislature, not 
this court. The setting of a truly desirable and effective 
coastal .construction control line along almost any seg- 
ment of the Florida coastline will inevitably involve 
mixed consideration of scientific knowledge and political 
c ~ n c e r n s . ~ ~  
The irony arises in comparing the above language to that 
of Justice Scalia in Lucas: 
Any limitation so severe [as a total taking] cannot be 
newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but 
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that 
background principles of the State's law of property and 
nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or de- 
cree with such an effect must, in other words, do no more 
45. Id. at 223, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314,.257 N.E.2d at 871. 
46. Island Harbor Beach Club, Ltd. v. Department of Natural Resources, 495 So. 
2d 209, 223-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
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than duplicate the result that could have been achieved 
in the courts - by adjacent landowners (or other 
uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of pri- 
vate nuisance, or by the State under its complementary 
power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, 
or otherwi~e.'~ 
By defining nuisance by reference to the case law, the 
Court has left the legislature little, if any, ability to regulate 
in its discretion. Under Boomer, New York's highest court de- 
clared its incompetence to handle matters involving broad ge- 
ographical impacts such as air pollution and, one would sup- 
pose, coastal protection. There is a worrisome Catch-22 
situation here, a gap in logic and strategy that protects the 
property owner from a total taking, leaving the communitar- 
ian interest in critical environmental protection in the breach. 
An interesting question is whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court, under its Lucas test, would include within the State's 
"law of property" its seller disclosure doctrine and the cus- 
toms and practices of the mortgage and insurance industries, 
which are shaped by prevailing legal considerations. If so, and 
if such practices discourage or prevent construction on the 
Lucas lots, there may be no "taking" under the rule articu- 
lated in Lucas, even when no productive use of the land is left 
to its owner. 
In this context, the options available to the state in pro- 
tecting its taxpayers and citizens from the growing expense 
and hazard of coastal erosion and violent winds amount to a 
sort of governmental Sophie's choice. South Carolina can pro- 
hibit development in close proximity to the beach, and risk 
having to compensate affected owners under Lucas. This risk 
is heightened because of the arrested development of the com- 
mon law of nuisance as discussed above. Or, the state and fed- 
eral governments can eliminate their insurance programs and 
transfer these costs to the affected property owners, a crush- 
ing burden for an important group of constituents. Alterna- 
tively, state and federal lawmakers can choose to continue 
47. 112 S. Ct. at 2900 (emphasis added). 
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these insurance programs, imposing the cost of compensation 
on the insurance companies required to participate in the 
state-mandated windstorm pool and on federal taxpayers 
under the federal flood insurance program. 
The costs associated with property damage due to coastal 
erosion alone are staggering. Recent analysis of this country's 
coastlines indicates that 90% of the shoreline along the Gulf 
and Atlantic coasts is eroding. The predicted rise in sea level 
attributed to global warming is now one foot in the next cen- 
tury, which will cause a retreat in the coastline of South Caro- 
lina of 200 feet. Estimates in North Carolina indicate that up 
to 5,000 existing structures may be lost to coastal erosion over 
the next sixty years.48 Add to this the billions of dollars lost in 
hurricanes Andrew and  hug^,'^ and the ramifications of this 
choice can be appreciated. In the face of such statistics, poli- 
cies that discourage or prevent new construction of beachfront 
homes seems eminently wise. Not surprisingly, such policies 
coincide with emerging trends in the private real estate 
marketplace. 
The complexity of all this bolsters the point of those who 
argue that the resolution of these issues ought to be left to the 
legislature, where all interest groups are heard, rather than to 
the courts, where only the interests of the litigants are articu- 
lated and resolved. This complexity also blunts the com- 
plaints of those who criticize the Court for failing to articulate 
a bright-line rule applicable to all takings cases. All of this 
calls on interests groups to collaborate to resolve these con- 
flicts in the broader best interests of society rather than seek 
individual remedies in the highly adversarial context of cases 
brought before the bench. 
48. Dennis J. Hwang, Shoreline Setback Regulations and the Takings Analysis, 
13 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1991). 
49. Peter Kerr, Insurers Prepare to Seek Rate Raises After Disasters , N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at p.1. It is estimated that Hurricane Andrew caused $10.2 bil- 
lion of damage in Florida and $500 million in Louisiana; Iniki caused $1.6 billion in 
damage in Hawaii. Prior to this year's storm, Hurricane Hugo, in 1989, was the na- 
tion's costliest storm, causing $4.2 billion in damage. Id. 
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VII. Applicability of Lucas 
The wording of the decision of Lucas itself confines it to 
regulatory takings cases that are "relatively rare."60 Other 
than creating an important nuisance and property law irony, I 
believe that the case does very little that is new and has lim- 
ited applicability to the regulatory takings debate generally. 
The decision quite possibly doesn't even resolve the dispute 
between David Lucas and the South Carolina Coastal Council, 
as the above analysis illustrates. 
My understanding of this field of law is that the Court 
tends to confine its holdings to similar types of fact situations. 
I call the types of disputes, like Lucas, in which regulations 
are rather summarily set aside by the Court, "undue burden" 
cases. In the Court's analysis, the regulation challenged in 
these cases goes beyond a reasonable police power limitation 
on property use and implicates the protection of property 
contained in the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation 
Clause. 
VIII. How Do Courts Decide Regulatory Takings Cases? 
The frustration of regulators and property owners with 
the flexibility that judges have retained in the regulatory tak- 
ings field is considerable. The jurisprudence of takings law has 
been described variously by respected commentators as "un- 
tidy and confused," "somewhat illogical," "a muddle," "a 
crazy-quilt pattern," "open-ended and standardless," "cha- 
otic," and "mystifying and incoherent." Is the sum of this that 
regulators and property owners are subject to the whim of 
judges who simply decide cases according to their life experi- 
ence? Karl Llewellyn argued that judges are guided by con- 
straining principles and techniques, but that they also have 
leeway in deciding cases, particularly where social values are 
in flux." He suggested that the facts lead judges to classify a 
dispute and that from that classification they search for the 
50. 112 S. Ct. at 2894. 
51. KARL N. LLEWELLYN. THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 99 (Paul Gewirtz ed. 
& Michael Ansald; trans., 1989). 
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applicable rules of law. 
A. Categories of Takings 
In the regulatory takings field there are four categories of 
fact patterns, which I classify as arbitration cases, undue bur- 
den cases, public values cases, and public injury cases. These 
categories can be illustrated by reviewing the opinions of the 
majority and dissent in the South Carolina State Supreme 
Court decision in Lucas and the majority decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court written by Justice Scalia. 
B. The Categories of Takings in Lucas 
The majority of the South Carolina Supreme Court read 
the Beachfront Management Act, and its prohibition of devel- 
opment on the Lucas lots as intending to protect a critical 
natural resource and to prevent serious public injury.6a The 
dissent, sympathetic to the complete destruction of market 
value, saw a legislature promoting tourism and preserving nat- 
ural habitats for wildlife. In this, "the most perplexing area of 
American land use. law," each side had at its disposal rules of 
law on which to rely to vindicate its sense of justi~e.'~ 
This state court debate illustrates two categories of "fact 
situations" in the regulatory takings field. The majority 
sensed that the legislature was preventing a great public harm 
and placed the case in a group of cases where the primary 
objective of the regulation is the prevention of public injury: 
the Public Injury Category. The dissent believed that the leg- 
islature was regulating to secure laudable public benefits, 
short of preventing noxious or offensive uses of land: the Pub- 
. lic Values Category. 
The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas placed 
these same facts in yet a third category. Since the regulation 
took all economically beneficial use, the "historical compact" 
contained in the takings clause may have been violated. Such 
52. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991). 
53. Id. at 903 (quoting Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington, Now 
You See It, Now You Don't, 12 U .  PUGET SOUND L. REV. 339 (1989)). 
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fact patterns constitute the "undue burden" category of cases, 
so labeled because the Court concludes that one or more indi- 
vidual owners of property have been singled out to bear a 
public burden that should be shouldered more broadly. 
These three categories cover those controversies that our 
society debates the most: the "growth area of the law," to use 
Llewellyn's term, where societal values are in flux and great 
debate of the type generated by Lucas is occurring. The more 
settled category of disputes involves regulations that adjust 
the benefits and burdens of economic life in a manner that 
secures an average reciprocity of advantage to everyone con- 
cerned. The perception is that such regulations fairly arbitrate 
the obligations and rights of citizenship and ownership; they 
can be placed in a group of cases called the Arbitration Cate- 
gory, a class that represents the "stable core" (Llewellyn's 
term) of regulatory takings law, about which there is less so- 
cial conflict and confusion in the law. Zoning ordinances are a 
classical example of such arbitration regulations. 
In these categories of cases, there are some constraints on 
the judiciary and some leeways. Within each category, judges 
seem constrained. First, they are committed to search for fun- 
damental fairness in the challenged regulation. Second, they 
make two demands of all regulations, following the AginsM 
prescription: the regulation must substantially advance a le- 
gitimate public interest and must not take all economically vi- 
able use of the property from the owner.66 Third, judges will 
not question or lightly set aside a legislative finding that a 
particular objective is a legitimate subject justifying public 
regulation of private rights. Fourth, in determining whether 
the property owner is unfairly burdened, they will look for 
reciprocity of advantage and whether similar properties are 
treated in the same way. Finally, they will put the initial bur- 
den of proving the unconstitutionality of the regulation on the 
challenger. This burden is easily borne, in the undue burden 
category, where the owner can show that she has suffered an 
invasion of her possession or has no value left. 
54. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
55. Id. at 260. 
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In other ways, judges are provided leeways that they are 
more likely to use where they sense that relatively few owners 
have been singled out to bear a burden in the public interest. 
Since public benefit and public injury cases tend to involve 
particularized restrictions on properties with special charac- 
teristics, judges tend to proceed with greater care and to ana- 
lyze, in more detail, whether these particular burdens are jus- 
tified. The cases have not articulated precise levels of judicial 
scrutiny that are applied in certain categories of disputes. The 
Court may engage in an ad hoc, factual inquiry of sufficient 
intensity to satisfy itself that the regulation is essentially fair. 
In such cases, the relationship between the regulatory objec- 
tive and the means chosen to accomplish it may be examined 
more carefully. If judges are satisfied that the regulation pre- 
vents uses of property that are injurious to the public, a find- 
ing of fairness is more likely than when the regulation is based 
on public values or sensibilities. In these latter cases, judges 
are more likely to engage in multi-factor balancing of the pub- 
lic and private interests affected by the regulation, though 
judges are not constrained to use any particular set of factors, 
nor are they required to balance or weigh them in any pre- 
ordained way. 
The sum of the U.S. Supreme Court regulatory takings 
case law is that the vast majority of regulations will be undis- 
turbed by the courts, simply because judges are trained to de- 
fer to legislative determinations, absent a showing of essential 
unfairness which is lacking in most cases. The much touted 
ambiguity of the case law and the stricter standards applied 
to regulations arise in very unusual fact situations such as the 
total takings context, an invasion of possessory rights, or 
rather obvious, in the Court's view, trammeling of fundamen- 
tal rights. With some exceptions, this ambiguity and these 
stricter rules will be limited to similar fact patterns. 
IX. The Principle of Maximum Fairness in Analyzing 
Regulatory Takings Cases 
When a court senses that it is dealing with a regulation 
that places an undue burden on the property owner, its opin- 
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ion focuses on the wrong to property; its sense of justice is 
offended. Predictably, the public policy pronouncements of 
the regulator enjoy less deference. 
The majority opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court Lucas 
decision illustrates the categorically different method of pro- 
ceeding once a case is placed in the undue burden category. It  
notes that in such a case "it is less realistic to indulge our 
usual assumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life."'66 This is because 
such regulations "carry with them a heightened risk that pri- 
vate property is being pressed into some form of public ser- 
vice."67 Even in these cases, where non-economic interests in 
property are regulated, these regulations "invite exceedingly 
close scrutiny under the Takings C lau~e . "~~  The challenger 
enjoys stricter judicial scrutiny of the regulation upon a show- 
ing that the regulation has "denied him economically benefi- 
cial use of his land."68 
The Lucas holding, therefore, should be confined to the 
facts of the case, which the Court itself states are "relatively 
rare.""O There is ample precedent for takings analysis of the 
Lucas variety in cases like Loretto v. Manhattan Tele- 
prompter CATV C ~ r p . ~ '  Although these previous cases do not 
fall quite like the Scalia guillotine in Lucas, the basic holding 
of Lucas is not a dramatic departure, if confined to cases 
where the regulation truly takes all value. 
The essential clue to a court that a regulation may be a 
taking requiring compensation under the just compensation 
clause is that the regulation has unfairly singled out a particu- 
lar owner, or group of owners, to bear a public burden that 
the public as a whole ought to be responsible for. It is this 
clue from cases like Lucas that ought to be picked up by regu- 
lators and their attorneys if they wish to insulate their restric- 
56. 112 S. Ct. at 2894, (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
57. Id. at 2895. 
58. Id. at 2895 n.8. 
59. Id. at 2893 n.6. 
60. Id. at 2894. 
61. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
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tions on property from attack as regulatory takings. Should 
they fail to do so, their ability to regulate property in the pub- 
lic interest may be limited by the legislature and their regula- 
tion may be found to violate the standards articulated in the 
undue burden category of regulatory takings cases. 
The practical lesson that may be learned from this is that 
land use regulators should strive to achieve essential fairness 
rather than relax into an assumed presumption of validity. 
For a variety of reasons, those who draft regulations should be 
guided by a principle of maximum fairness and engage, them- 
selves, in the exercises undertaken by the courts in close 
cases. Among these reasons are the following: 
First, a regulatory regime that is generally fair might 
seem unduly burdensome as applied to a particular owner, 
triggering more careful judicial analysis, a takings finding and 
public cost and embarrassment. 
Second, because judges do enjoy leeways in this field, and 
the rules in one category of case can bleed through to other 
categories, there is no guarantee that a given set of facts will 
be placed in a particular category. 
Third, by proceeding fairly in regulating land uses, situa- 
tions that lead courts and commentators to use phrases like 
"out-and-out plan of extortion" and "predatory practices" can 
be avoided along with the perception that land use regulation, 
in general, has gone too far. Unless this happens, victories in 
the courtroom can be negated in legislative chambers. The 
Private Property Rights Act of 1991 would constrain the issu- 
ance of needed and useful regulations. Such legislative pro- 
posals are less likely to succeed if the need for them is not felt 
by lawmakers. 
Fourth, productive use of land is respected by the law. 
Regulations that intrude on such uses only as far as necessary 
to accomplish their environmental or other public objective 
are less vulnerable to invalidation in the courts by judges 
trained to respect private property rights as well as the discre- 
tion of legislatures. 
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A. Supporting Justification 
If a land use regulation is not supported by findings that 
clearly demonstrate its public purpose and justify its private 
burdens, judges will be thrown back on their own sense of 
fairness. For this reason, regulations should always contain 
detailed findings of fact that support their adoption and im- 
pacts. As Justice Scalia counselled, this needs "to be more 
than an exercise in cleverness and imaginati~n."~~ In justify- 
ing any regulation, or analyzing whether it is constitutional, 
there are several key questions that are helpful to ask. 
First, is the public objective pursued by the regulatory 
scheme clearly stated and convincingly supported? 
Second, is the close connection between the regulatory 
means and the burdens imposed obvious on the face of the 
regulation? Third, is it possible to characterize the regulatory 
scheme as an arbitration matter? Are the burdens of the regu- 
lation shared by a relatively large number of property owners 
including all similarly situated owners? Are there any special 
benefits from the regulation that run to those owners? If a 
relatively few owners are burdened, is there a convincing rea- 
son why this has to be so? 
Fourth, does the regulation effect, directly or indirectly, 
an invasion of the owner's possessory rights? Is there any 
other alternative to accomplishing the regulatory end that 
does not involve an invasion? If the regulation effects a result 
that appears to constitute a traditional government enter- 
prise, such as the preservation of open space, is there a con- 
vincing rationale for regulating rather than taking the prop- 
erty under eminent domain? Is there a possibility that the 
regulation will prevent all productive use of particular proper- 
ties? If so, could the use have been prevented under the 
state's nuisance law or prevailing property law? Does the reg- 
ulation have hardship exceptions to prevent total takings? If 
not, is their absence justified? 
-- 
62. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987). 
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X. The Comprehensive Plan and the Principle of 
Maximum Fairness 
Judges will have fewer occasions to second-guess regula- 
tors when it is obvious, in the structure of the regulatory pro- 
gram, that considerable and comprehensive planning was in- 
volved. This is illustrated by Gardner u. New Jersey 
Pinelands Comrni~sion.~~ In Gardner, a property owner was 
burdened by regulations that were drafted in response to fed- 
eral and state legislation designed to protect the New Jersey 
Pine Barrens. The breadth of concern in the legislation is con- 
' 
siderable, despite its primary focus on the preservation of the 
fragile ecosystem. The state authorized the designation of 
"protection areas" for the promotion of agriculture and "ap- 
propriate patterns of compatible residential, commercial and 
industrial development . . . ."'" The Pinelands Commission 
adopted land use regulations, based on and consistent with a 
"comprehensive management plan," subject to the approval of 
the Secretary of the Interior of the United States. In this re- 
gime, the legislature and its regulatory agency arbitrated a full 
range of public concerns and private interests. 
In Gardner the court quickly saw the analogy between 
this regulatory approach and zoning: "Because the Pinelands 
scheme is fundamentally a regime of zoning, takings doctrine 
dealing with zoning is particularly r e l e~an t . "~~  The court 
noted that the regulation complained of had a particular im- 
pact on property with special characteristics, akin to the im- 
pacts of "complex, special-purpose regulations" where the de- 
mands of the judicial takings analysis "may become more 
e lab~ra te . "~~  The tone of the court's analysis, in this dual con- 
text, was respectful of the legislative determinations involved. 
Under the Pine Barrens program, the large-scale reciproc- 
ity of advantage in the regulatory scheme is inherent in its 
concern for economic as well as ecological interests, paralleling 
the breadth of concerns of zoning itself. As Justice Stevens 
63. 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991). 
64. Id. at 254-55. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 13:18A-9b. 
65. 593 A.2d at 257. 
66. Id. 
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writes in his dissent in Lucas, "[Plerhaps the most familiar 
application of this principle of generality arises in zoning 
cases. A diminution of value caused by a zoning regulation is 
far less likely to constitute a taking if it is part of a general 
and comprehensive land use plan."e7 
Many land use regulations are adopted and enforced by 
public agencies that are either parochial or narrow in their fo- 
cus. Local governments tend to be parochial, limited in their 
concern to property and affairs within their limited geographi- 
cal boundaries. State and federal environmental regulations 
tend to focus narrowly on issues such as air quality, an estu- 
ary, an aquifer, specific wetlands, a scenic river, or a toxic 
waste site. When these regulations stray from public injury 
prevention, as the minority of the South Carolina Supreme 
Court felt the Beachfront Management Act did in Lucas, they 
risk invalidation under takings scrutiny. This risk is abated, if 
they are part of a more comprehensive approach such as that 
found in Gardner. Regulations that carry out objectives of a 
comprehensive plan are more easily seen ,as being in accord 
with the principle of generality, conferring reciprocal advan- 
tages, falling into the arbitration class and meriting the full 
deference that reviewing courts afford such regulatory 
programs. 
With single-purpose regulations, emanating from state 
and federal agencies, and with parochial local regulations, it is 
less clear that the public interest is fully considered and that 
the regulatory scheme, in balance, bestows reciprocal benefits 
as broadly as possible. The lack of order in a system of unco- 
ordinated regulations, some parochial, some narrow in focus, 
is itself burdensome; developers' proposals are often subject to 
multiple-agency reviews by different levels of government. It  
is obvious that a comprehensive and coordinated system of 
land use regulation furthers the essential fairness sought by 
courts in examining regulations. 
The relatively recent appearance of comprehensive state- 
wide land use legislation, coinciding with the quickening pace 
67. 112 S. Ct. at 2923. 
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of regulatory takings challenges is intriguing. Such initiatives, 
often called growth management statutes, generally require 
that state and local regulations be tied to comprehensive land 
use plans. Such plans consider, arbitrate, and represent a wide 
variety of interests including economic and residential devel- 
opment, infrastructure provision, the provision of open space 
and recreational facilities, and the protection of the environ- 
ment, among others. This is the type of collaborative effort, 
representing both property and environmental interests, that 
is needed as an antidote to the rash of regulatory takings 
cases and the emerging trend toward property rights 
legislation. 
In the typical growth management statute, state-wide 
land use objectives are articulated and local plans are urged or 
required to be consistent with those objectives. Emphasis is 
, 
placed on need analysis and data gathering, and the integra- 
tion of that information into comprehensive plans. Informa- 
tion is often assembled at the regional level, and regulations 
are tied to meeting those regional needs. The plans that result 
tend to be comprehensive in subject matter and geographical 
in focus, truly arbitrating a broad range of public and private 
interests in a uniform fashion. The publicity attending the 
consideration and adoption of such plans gives notice to prop- 
erty owners and purchasers of future allowable land cases. 
These plans are then used as the justification for specific land 
use regulations, such as zoning, at the local level. They also 
guide the issuance of single-purpose regulations by state agen- 
cies, as well as the expenditure of local, state and federal 
funds on capital infrastructure such as bridges, public transit, 
highways and water and sewer systems. 
When a regulation, challenged as a taking, is carefully in- 
tegrated into such a comprehensive system of land use regula- 
tion, the natural tendency of judges toward deference to law 
makers will be greatly reinforced. If there is a threat to the 
potency of legislatures from stricter judicial scrutiny of land 
use regulations, legislating comprehensively and intelligently 
in this fashion and adhering to the principle of maximum fair- 
ness will keep control where it historically has been. Absent a 
showing by a particular property owner of an egregious bur- 
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den in her case, justices are more likely to behave as they did 
in Gardner, deferring in tone and substance to the rule of law 
as competently expressed by the elected representatives of the 
people. 
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